Self-Regulation of Betting Operators: a regulatory proposal

Abstract

The recent process of institutionalizing fixed-odds betting in Brazil has reignited the debate over the most appropriate regulatory models to govern a sector characterized by technological innovation, social risks, and strong private-sector involvement. In this context, this article examines the self-regulation of betting operators as a complementary instrument to state regulation, analyzing its theoretical foundations, legal limits, and potential effectiveness within the Brazilian legal system. Adopting a dogmatic and functional approach to Regulatory Administrative Law, the study investigates the compatibility of self-regulation with principles such as legality, the public interest, the protection of fundamental rights, and accountability, as well as its integration into the regulatory framework established by recent legislation. The article analyzes normative and practical experiences of self-regulation in the sector, highlighting their mechanisms, advantages, and risks, particularly with regard to information asymmetry, regulatory capture, and the protection of vulnerable consumers. It ultimately argues that self-regulation, when structured under clear parameters of state oversight and transparency, can contribute to greater regulatory efficiency without undermining the State’s non-delegable role in safeguarding the public interest and mitigating the social impacts associated with betting.